| 1. | All three parties benefit from external recruitment
3外部聘用中涉及的三方都会从中获益。 |
| 2. | ( 1 ) why external recruitment can be viewed as a phenomenon during economic development under asymmetric information
第一，为什么企业的外部聘用是经济发展过程中在信息不对称情况下产生的一种现象？ |
| 3. | ( 3 ) why interaction between people in internal promotion and external recruitment is a procedure to enhance enterprise and economic development
第三，为什么说企业内部晋升和外部聘用中人与人之间的相互作用、知识的传播是对企业发展和经济增长的促进过程？ |
| 4. | ( 2 ) why the classical model by william chan can not explain external recruitment of managers as a phenomenon during economic development
第二，为什么williamchan内部晋升与外部聘用的经典模型并不能很好地解释经济发展过程中的企业高层管理人员调整的内在机制？ |
| 5. | There is risk in external recruitment because of the asymmetric information in the market . sometimes , external recruitment deteriorates enterprises " performances rather than improves them . 2
由于劳动力市场（经理市场）上信息不充分，外部聘用是有风险的，有时外部聘用的管理人员不能改善企业的绩效，而是使之恶化。 |
| 6. | Generally speaking , there are differences in ability between insiders and outsiders , so the efficiency of insiders can be improved by external recruitment through the change in organizational structure and thoughts . 3
一般地，由于企业内部员工和外部聘用者存在能力和素质的差异，外部聘用可以借助于先进生产方式的引进，观念和组织形式的改变等提高内部员工的生产效率。 |
| 7. | The 2nd chapter surveys the general theories of promotion and discusses the relation between promotion , resource allocation and incentive . the 3rd chapter focuses on external recruitment of top managers . chapter 4 studies the classical model about internal promotion and external recruitment ,
第二章、第三章和第四章梳理以前的研究文献：在第二章中讨论了一般的晋升激励理论，讨论晋升与资源配置和激励的关系；在第三章焦点集中到对高层主管的外部聘用的讨论；在第四章中讨论目前研究内部晋升与外部聘用的经典模型的williamchan模型。 |
| 8. | Existing theories concerning internal promotion and external recruitment are mainly static and equilibrium ones as chan model . the viewpoint in this thesis is that external recruitment of managers is a persistent phenomenon during economic development because of asymmetric information in the manager market . external recruitment is a procedure for enterprises to discover information of managers " ability
既有的内部晋升和外部聘用的理论主要是以chan模型为代表的静态均衡模型，而本文的主要观点是：企业通过外部市场聘用管理人员是经济发展过程中的持续现象，这种现象之所以持续存在，是因为管理人才的信息在市场上是不对称的，企业聘用外部管理人才的过程是一个管理才能的信息发现过程，企业利用自己的信息优势上有管理者创新的部分收益也是企业得以发展的动力之一。 |
